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1. Introduction 
Frank Popper was the first to have used the concept of LULU (Locally Unwanted Land 
Uses) in 1981. LULU may refer to low-cost housing, power plants, airports, wastewater 
treatment plants, prisons, open-cast mines, energy supply lines, motorways, dams, oil 
refineries, railway lines, landfills, cemeteries, amusement parks or pubs or military facilities 
(Popper, 1981). Almost every major regional development project (petrol station, car repair 
shop, motel, parking house, rent-a-car company etc.) behaves like a LULU, and often even 
facilities which at first sight seem to be desired by the community (office building, 
residential park, luxury hotel, hospital, assembly shop, port etc.) come to the fate of LULUs. 
It would be very difficult to describe by one word why these facilities sometimes provoke 
such extraordinary resistance. Fear from physical injuries may be a motive, the same as 
concern about the stigmatisation of the host settlement and the consequent drop in real 
estate prices. Some negative impacts are certain to occur (e.g. increase in air pollution and 
noise load near a newly completed motorway section), whereas others have a very low 
occurrence probability (such as the leakage of a nuclear waste repository, for example). The 
negative health or economic impacts may be accompanied by negative social impacts, such 
as the erosion of the social networks or the often irreversible alteration of the local cultures 
(Lesbirel, 2003). In the context of an international comparative survey of the motives of 
protest against the siting of low-level nuclear waste repositories, Anna Vári and her fellow 
researchers came to the conclusion that concerns about undesirable facilities typically fall 
into five categories: the opponents of the repositories expressed health and safety, economic, 
environmental and social as well as technical and decision-making-related concerns (Vári et 
al., 1991).  
In addition to LULU, another commonly used acronym in connection with the siting of 
facilities of the above type is NIMBY, i.e. not in my backyard. For the purpose of completeness, 
let me mention that in addition to the two well-known acronyms (LULU and NIMBY), new 
ones have also appeared in the technical literature and the media, such as NOPE (Not on 
Planet Earth) or BANANA (Build absolutely nothing anywhere near anybody). The NIMBY 
phenomenon carries an important additional meaning relative to LULU: it is used mainly to 
denote investments considered reasonable even by the opponents of the facility (a refuse 
incinerator, for example, which is necessary at national or regional level, and the absence of 
which could threaten waste management), who question only why it needs to be built in their 
backyards and not elsewhere (Sjöberg–Drottz-Sjöberg, 2001). 
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In this chapter the social conflicts around the siting of Hungarian waste management 
facilities will be introduced and discussed. In the following section a general overview on 
the environmental conflicts of the transition period is given, and then in section 3 the 
research methodology is presented. Section 4, 5 and 6 deal with concrete mini case studies 
on siting conflicts. In section 7 the case studies are discussed, while section 8 contains some 
conclusions. 
2. The transition and environmental conflicts in Hungary 
The communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe collapsed in 1989 enabling the set up 
of new democracies bringing the right for free speech, free elections, market economy, etc. to 
these countries. Post-communist societies had to learn to exploit the opportunities inherent 
in the newly established political and economic systems. Among many revelations, people 
began to understand what participation in local politics meant, how they could articulate 
their opinion in the local political arena, or how they were able to veto certain undesired 
decisions in regional and municipal level. Although transition in Central and Eastern 
European countries happened with different pace and intensity, Hungary definitely was one 
of the countries that adopted the new institutions the most rapidly at the beginning of the 
political transformation. The history of environmental decision making is an emblematic 
example of this learning process. 
2.1 Siting conflicts as a form of anti-communist movements 
Hungarian research focusing on environmental decisions began in the 1980s. The most 
important case of the era was the conflict concerning the construction of the Bős-
Nagymarosi Dam, but the siting of the hazardous waste incinerator in Dorog also provoked 
many disputes (Faragó et al., 1989). These cases highlighted an important aspect of the 
situation in Hungary: they culminated at a historical moment which defined their further 
fate. The dam was a symbol of political power threading through everything of the 
totalitarian party regime (Fleischer, 1993). Protest against the dam was obviously a way to 
demonstrate against the regime, and hence the conflict acquired a connotation that was 
different from that of the typical Western European and North American conflicts. By the 
end of the eighties, it had become impossible to prevent the population from expressing its 
opinion on environmental decisions. One of the most important features of the siting 
conflicts at the time of transition, namely their dynamically changing institutional, political 
and social environment (something that existed hardly or not at all in Western European 
research) may reinforce our belief that the social institution systems (or their absence) have a 
major influence on the course of progress of social conflicts of this type.  
The case of Bős-Nagymaros, however, highlighted many other factors as well. Firstly, it 
turned out that the tug of war of the actors of the central political power often manifests 
itself in specific cases and overrides expert considerations. Secondly, since the different 
positions ought to have been reconciled with the contribution of Czechoslovakia and later 
on Slovakia, the conflict, quite severe anyway, acquired an international dimension. The 
case of the dam shed further shadows on the far-from-cloudless relationship of the two 
countries, laden with conflicts historically. The national governments often used the case of 
the Dam to achieve their own home policy targets, without making a real effort to come to a 
solution. Decades later a similar dilemma recurred in the form of the conflict provoked by 
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the siting of the Rosia Montana (Romania) gold mine, when the Hungarian state took action 
as stakeholder of the case.1 
The siting of the Dorog hazardous waste incinerator was another problem given excessive 
media coverage in the eighties. The case was present throughout the decade, and it differed 
from that of the Dam in that it displayed problems similar to the ones we encountered in the 
Western European and North-American literature. The plan of Kőbánya Pharmaceutical 
Factory to site a hazardous waste incinerator in Dorog, near Budapest, met with strong 
opposition there. There were already several polluting plants in the town (the 
pharmaceutical factory, a power plant and a briquette plant), and these imposed a 
significant burden on its environmental status. The residents were afraid that a new 
polluting factory would worsen the already unfavourable health conditions. The fact that 
the protesters held out despite the compensation packages being offered raises several 
questions. Knowledge commanded by the population and the experts, respectively, proved 
to be very different, the same as their points of reference. Distrust between the parties and 
their different value systems deepened the conflict even further (for a more detailed 
description of the case, see Faragó et al., 1989). The problems encountered in Dorog were 
obviously the same as those indicated by the relevant international literature (further 
pollution of areas exposed to environmental hazards already, and its moral aspects; 
reservations concerning compensation, and differences in risk perceptions). 
Viktória Szirmai’s study inquiring into the Hungarian circumstances (Szirmai, 1999) devotes 
an entire chapter to the “environmental social conflicts of the transition period”, in which 
the author proposes a conflict typology, investigates the role of conflicts, and presents 
prevention options (Szirmai, 1999). Szirmai assigns environmental conflicts to five groups: 
conflicts to protect the values of the natural environment, protests against specific 
environmental damages, environmental conflicts related to waste management, urban 
development interventions, and infrastructure investments. In this study I focus on the 
environmental conflicts related to waste management, especially facility siting. 
2.2 Facility siting and waste management 
The transition period experienced a lot of siting conflicts in Hungary, many of them were 
related to landfills, dumps, and other waste management facilities. Around the date of EU 
accession the largest items of the Hungarian environmental state budget were spent on 
creation of new waste management facilities mostly with EU co-funding. Many of the 
landfills that were created before the transition period became obsolete and most of them 
were not in accordance with actual EU regulations therefore new facilities were needed. 
Although industrial waste production has significantly dropped since 1990, the municipal 
waste generation has been still a crucial issue in the country (Pomázi, 2010). (Of course, 
municipal solid waste represents a lot smaller proportion than industrial waste production.) 
Municipal solid waste is mainly utilized in landfills (more than 80% of the waste is 
                                                 
1 Since few scientific reflections exist so far on this case which met with such considerable press 
reaction, I shall refrain from its more detailed presentation and analysis here. However, it can be stated 
that several of the basic siting approaches appear in this case: investors and politicians arguing that the 
economically deprived region will prosper are opposed to the locals and the civil and other interest 
groups (the government included) concerned by the risks involved. As in the case of the Bős-
Nagymaros Dam, party policy skirmishes, this time Romanian ones have made their impact on the 
development of the conflict. 
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transported to these facilities), some of them is incinerated (around 6%), and the rest is 
recycled or composted (see Figure 1.).  
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Fig. 1. Utilization of municipal solid waste (in thousand tons), source: HCSO 
According to the relevant data, conflicts related to waste management issues mainly explode 
in minor settlements, with some exceptions (the cases that will be presented in this chapter 
are good illustrations for this phenomenon). In a previous study (Szántó, 2008) I pointed out 
that the settlements concerned are characterised by unemployment figures exceeding, 
occasionally excessively, the national average (the unemployment rate for example was 
thrice that of the national rate in Boda (County Baranya), considered a candidate for high 
level radioactive waste repository siting (see the case study later in this chapter), and in 
Liptód (in the same county), which rejected the siting of an envisaged waste disposal facility 
in 2000, it exceeded 30%). The higher rate of pension recipients in these settlements suggests 
a high rate of the elderly. If we compare that with the low amount of personal income tax 
payments, it is quite clear that the settlements where waste-related social conflicts have 
occurred are probably the worst off, and they are characterised by rather low income and 
excessively high unemployment rates. 
One could assume that a settlement like that would jump at the chance of a new investment, 
but the experience of specific cases is that poor incomes and high-level unemployment are 
not enough to make the residents approve an investment almost automatically if the 
envisaged facility is thought to be highly problematic. Nevertheless, it is no accident that 
investors tend to look for such sites. They probably believe that the prospects of job creation, 
local tax revenues and other forms of compensation will make the local stakeholders accept 
the hazardous facilities more easily. 
3. Methodology and data 
Research methodologies based on case studies are especially popular in the area of siting 
decisions laden with environmental conflicts, not only in Hungary, but also in many other 
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parts of the world where such research is carried out. This is no accident. Researchers meet 
with many viewpoints in the context of most siting decisions. There are many perspectives, 
and many actors with different motives, which makes it difficult to design and carry out a 
well-operationalised quantitative research project. Research is further aggravated by the 
difficulty of separating the phenomenon under study from its context (if that is possible at 
all), and this is another circumstance which may encourage the researcher to apply 
qualitative research methodologies (and in particular case study method) (Yin, 1994). 
 
Case Type of waste Years 
The North-east Pest County Waste Management 
program 
solid municipal 
waste 
2002-2004 
North-Balaton Region landfill 
solid municipal 
waste 
2001-2010 
Battery waste recycling facilities hazardous waste 1985-2009 
Alternative fuel in the cement factory  hazardous waste 2002-2005 
Low-level nuclear waste repository nuclear waste 1987-2009 
High-level nuclear waste repository in Boda nuclear waste 1995- 
Table 1. Case studies on social conflicts 
In this chapter six mini case studies are presented in order to highlight the most important 
factors of social conflicts around siting decisions (Table 1. contains the selected cases and 
their most important attributes). All case studies have occurred in the last two decades, but 
some of them have roots in the communist era. The case studies were elaborated by using 
data from primary and secondary sources. In two cases, I relied mostly on case study 
interviews (the waste battery processing plant and the Vác cement factory cases), while the 
other case studies are based on mainly secondary data sources: articles from the national 
and local press, and studies made by other researchers. Of course, these mini case studies 
are rather illustrations of the most important symptoms and underlying causes of the 
Hungarian siting conflicts, and they cannot be considered as a comprehensive description of 
the conflicts of the last two decades. 
4. Solid waste facility siting 
A series of events having “enjoyed” extensive media coverage in the last two decades, 
mostly problems associated with regional solid waste disposal facilities. Larger cities 
(Budapest and county capitals) have been facing with the dilemma of the growing need for 
larger solid waste disposal facilities that were able to handle the solid waste output of these 
communities. The concept of regional landfills was popularized by the European Union; 
hence more and more depositories were planned in the country. The deposition-oriented 
solid waste management in Hungary obviously has been triggering more and more 
conflicts; more focus on prevention of waste generation would be able to mitigate the 
intensity of disagreements in the future. 
4.1 The North-east Pest county waste management program 
The social conflicts around the plans of the North-east Pest County Regional Waste Disposal 
Facility might have received the greatest publicity amongst all cases (Kiss, 2005). Of course, 
it is not surprising. Pest County is located in the heart of Hungary, has many ties with the 
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country’s capital Budapest, and is one of the most developed regions of the country. The 
events of the siting ‘saga’ were published in major newspapers and a comprehensive case 
study was elaborated about the siting process (Kovács & Sándor, 2004). Since eight different 
villages were invited for accepting the waste management facility and all of them rejected 
the idea, the social conflicts were apparent even to the wider public. The rejections mostly 
came in a form of a veto: seven municipalities organized local referenda between 2002 and 
2004, and the number of ‘no’ votes prevailed all the time.  
The project originally was brought together by nine municipalities, but soon after that many 
other villages and towns joint to the consortium, finally 59 municipalities took part in the 
program. They planned to set up a new regional landfill that would handle the municipal 
solid waste of the region in Püspökszilágy. In this village waste management facilities were 
not unknown to the inhabitants; a low-level nuclear waste repository was already in 
operation there. In spite of this (or may be just because of this) the people of Püspökszilágy 
rejected the siting of a landfill in 2002. This was the first rejection that was followed by seven 
others; only one village – Valkó – would have supported the new site, but in this case the 
Ministry for Environment and Water vetoed the construction. Numerous stakeholder 
groups were involved in the siting process; inhabitants were supported by local and 
national environmental activist groups. The referenda showed that most people refused to 
have a waste management facility even with valuable economic compensations. Some critics 
claimed that rival waste management companies also enhanced the social conflicts since 
they opposed the new facility to be built from a business point of view (Kiss, 2005).  
At the beginning of 2004 decision makers seeing the series of failures declared that there is 
no need for a large regional landfill, but modernization and expansion of existing facilities 
are sufficient for handling waste management problems of the county. 
4.2 The landfill of the North-Balaton region 
The North-Balaton waste management project similarly to the formerly introduced North-
east Pest County program had a long story in the first years of the new millennium. 
Veszprém with its 64,000 inhabitants plays a central role in the North-Balaton region; it is a 
cultural and economic centre. The increasing level of the municipal solid waste produced in 
the city worried city officials and they set up alternative courses of action in order to solve 
the problem. Their first idea was to expand the existing landfill of the city, however due to 
environmental reasons (the expanded landfill would have been built on a karstic area where 
no waste management facility can be placed) they had to give up this plan. 
In Királyszentistván, which is located 10 km away from Veszprém, in 2001 a local 
referendum was held where the people of the tiny village (it has approximately 500 
inhabitants) rejected the idea of a new regional landfill. The village seemed to be completely 
divided: the difference was so small that only ten votes decided. Other municipalities such 
as Ajka or Nagyvazsony earlier expressed that they would not welcome a noxious facility. 
However, the biggest disputes occurred in Szentgál where the people supported the siting 
of a new landfill, yet the neighbouring towns and villages heavily opposed the plans. 
Although the proposed facility would have been located officially in Szentgál, it would have 
been closer to the houses of the neighbouring municipalities; hence the negative 
consequences such as smell, environmental risks, increased traffic, etc. would have affected 
mostly them. Moreover, the project management team offered a compensation only for the 
locals of Szentgál (among others they offered a large sum of money for the renovation of the 
local elementary school), but the neighbours were neglected in this process. Although the 
people of Szentgál voted with yes in a referendum in 2003, the facility was never built there 
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since the surrounding villages sued the investor company. By launching a litigation case the 
neighbouring villages created a dead end for the investment in Szentgál, since the 
construction could not have been started till the court did not make a decision. However, 
time pressure was enormous on the investors: they had to start building the site till 2006; 
otherwise the EU funding would have been lost. 
Surprisingly enough the project management team after the fiasco, went back to 
Királyszentistván where the initiative was also a failure several years before. Nonetheless 
they implemented a more efficient strategy this time, they informed the people, and offered 
compensation for some neighbouring villages as well. During the second referendum the 
project was now supported, and the landfill was constructed, and finally opened in 2010. 
5. Social conflicts around hazardous waste siting 
As Table 1. highlighted the amount of hazardous waste has been decreasing recently; in 
2008 it dropped bellow one million tons (Hungarian Central Statistical Office [HCSO], 2010). 
In this section two emblematic case studies will be introduced: (1) the brief history of the 
battery waste recycling facilities, and (2) the DDC Cement factory case where hazardous 
waste was utilized as an alternative fuel in the factory. 
5.1 The brief history of the battery waste recycling facilities 
The case of battery waste recycling facilities was discussed in several works, although each 
case study focused on a different stage of the events (Szirmai, 1999; Szántó 2010). This case, 
which has been dragging on for years, is the model example of Hungarian siting decisions, 
which exemplifies almost every one of the errors which can be committed by the decision-
makers, while also shedding light on the institutional, political and social factors influencing 
the siting of undesired facilities. A waste battery recycler is a typical NIMBY facility: the 
majority of the Hungarian society accepts its necessity in general terms (not to mention the 
international disapproval of shipping hazardous waste across the borders), but will show 
fierce local opposition to any specific siting attempt. Without a recycling facility the waste 
batteries must be exported to the neighbouring countries such as Austria and Slovenia and 
waste battery containing a valuable amount of lead are reused there. 
In Gyöngyösoroszi, most objections concerned the prospective technology, beside the 
already high environmental load of the area; in Komló, the plan was condemned to failure 
by the counter-reactions of the adjacent settlements, which thought that they would share 
the burdens with the residents of Komló, whereas the benefits (local taxes, jobs) would go 
exclusively to the host settlement. 
In Monok, a settlement at the gate of the Tokaj vine region, siting efforts failed because the 
local viticulturists felt that they threatened the reputation of the Tokaj wines, and did 
everything to kill the siting by their protest actions. Nevertheless, the inhabitants of Monok 
led by their mayor supported the idea to have a hazardous facility nearby since the new 
investment would have brought new jobs (around 200 employees would have been hired if 
the plant had been constructed) and growing tax revenues for the village. The 
unemployment rate in Monok exceeds the national figures significantly and the incomes of 
the local people just lag behind the one of more developed regions. Despite the differences 
in the underlying reasons, the success of the opposition was due in every case to forming a 
local coalition and to pooling the local interests (Szirmai, 1999) and, with the exception of 
Monok, the cases concerned confirmed again that investors like to site facilities at locations 
which have already hosted (voluntarily or under some constraint) a hazardous facility of 
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some sort. A shift in favour of less resistance is, of course, reasonable, but it may be 
challenged on the ground of the failures and moral problems. Fear from stigmatisation is 
also discernible in the Monok case: the Tokaj farmers feared – probably with good reason – 
that their products will be less marketable if it turns out that there is a waste battery 
recycling facility near the vine-growing region.2 The investor realizing the hostility of the 
potential host municipalities had to withdraw. This siting process seems to be a never-
ending story since the problem is not solved entirely yet even in 2011. 
5.2 Heating with alternative fuel – The case of the DDC cement factory 
Contrary to the above-described cases, the Vác cement factory case concerns the 
introduction of a new technology, not the siting of a new facility. Consequently, it differs in 
some essential respects from the previous ones. The envisaged introduction of hazardous 
waste incineration, however, can be conceived of as a special siting decision, and its 
reception was rather similar to the social conflicts triggered by the prospects of the new 
facilities of the battery waste recycling plants.  
The hazardous waste incineration case of Duna-Dráva Cement (DDC) broke out in 2002. In 
November 2002, the company announced that the Central Danube Valley Environmental 
Protection Inspectorate authorised the factory to incinerate waste, including hazardous 
waste, as part of the cement manufacturing process. The permit applied to an annual 75 
thousand tonnes of waste, a substantial part of which could be hazardous waste. The issue 
of alternative waste incineration had already been raised in the factory previously due to the 
many foreign experiences demonstrating the applicability and cost-effectiveness of this 
technology. The announcement was followed by protests on such scale as was unexpected 
to both the company management and the municipality. Some environmentalist groups 
disputed the professionalism of the environmental protection examinations, and in 
November 2002, the Hungarian Green Party started canvassing for signatures and in a short 
time it collected around 800 signatures from protesters. DDC and Vác municipality 
organised a forum together with the Vác Environmentalist Society, where it turned out that 
the factory had been experimenting with the incineration of various acid-resin-containing 
materials (spent oil, so-called Cemix and Mumix mixtures). (The factory was repeatedly 
accused of illegal waste-burning, but as a matter of fact they had had a permit for 
experimental acid resin burning valid until August 2001.) Several appeals were lodged 
against the resolution of the National Environmental Protection Inspectorate. Some objected 
to the incineration site being close to a school, and others found it injurious that the waste 
transports would probably increase the already quite heavy traffic on main road 2. 
The Duna-Dráva Cement case culminated in 2003 and 2004. In January 2003, the National 
Inspectorate cancelled the waste incineration permit with reference to procedural errors, and 
obliged DDC to have a new impact assessment made. The Inspectorate was of the opinion that 
public hearings had to be held on cases like that, and the company had to make a full 
environmental impact assessment. Although the representatives of the company and of Vác 
municipality repeatedly emphasised that there were no professional arguments against the 
incineration of waste and in particular hazardous waste, and that the process was in full 
compliance with the environmental protection requirements, the opposition prevailed. After a 
                                                 
2 A local press organ published an article entitled “Chernobyl, too, was believed to be safe” in 
connection with the siting of the hazardous waste processing plant in Monok (Szántó, 2010). The 
envisaged investment was often compared to facilities which, although they did not have much in 
common with waste processing plants, evoked experiences which could stigmatise it. 
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change in ownership in the nineties, the company tried to break with its previous negative 
image (the “one of the dirty dozen” nickname), but the image of the smoke-emitting cement 
factory and the awful dust it produced have never been forgotten by the locals. 
In reaction to the protests, first of all an AdHoc Committee was formed to receive the 
complaints and observations of Vác residents and to forward them to the company 
management and, vice versa, to relay information obtained on the activity of the company to 
the population. The members of the six-strong committee included the heads of three Vác-
based NGOs, the managing director of the factory, the environmental councillor of the 
municipality and a citizen of Vác. Although the members were independent, except for the 
factory managing director, the most prominent opponents were not represented on the 
committee. A toll-free hot line was installed in the Mayor’s Office, where the locals could 
make announcements concerning the factory. Given the social pressure, the propositions of 
the civilians were taken into account in the full environmental impact assessment. This 
process took almost one year. In the meantime, the company came to realise that, to have the 
new technology accepted, it must open up towards society: they organised open days and 
pursued more intensive communication concerning the activity of the company and the 
waste incineration process itself. DDC’s operation was shown on the local TV channels, and 
they, too, introduced a toll-free call number to receive questions and opinions. The company 
issued a newsletter called Monitor, which presented its activity and made public opinion 
polls to probe the attitude of the population to it. DDC enhanced its already quite 
impressive sponsoring activity: according to their own statistics, sponsoring expenditures 
doubled from 2002 to 2004.  
The full environmental impact assessment was made public almost one year after the break-
out of the events, in September 2003. On 24 February 2004, the Social Control Group was 
formed, the members of which were recruited mainly from the representatives of the 
previous AdHoc Committee: its president was the secretary of the Environmentalist Society 
of Vác (Váci Környezetvédelmi Egyesület), and its 13 members included the managing 
director of the Vác factory (who used to be on the AdHoc Committee), the representatives of 
certain civil organisations of Vác, the representatives of the municipalities of Vác and other 
settlements, and other opinion-leader personalities of the town. The Group was created 
pursuant to the decision of the mayor and the management of DDC, to ensure 
comprehensive social control over the cement factory and not in the least to build public 
trust in the factory. The opposition diminished considerably over the 18 months under 
study, but it could not be eliminated totally.  
6. Nuclear waste and siting 
Research in the 1980s revealed that the rejection rate was highest for facilities regarded as 
definitely hazardous, such as nuclear power plants and incinerators of hazardous waste (i.e. 
risk factors associated with relatively low probability of occurrence and catastrophic 
consequences) (Kasperson, 1986; Mitchell–Carson, 1986). In Hungary siting of radioactive 
waste repositories has not been such a hot issue as it was for example in the United States 
where in the last decades no nuclear waste management facility has been created. In this 
section – following the logics of the international literature – the low-level and high-level 
nuclear waste repositories will be introduced separately since these cases showed different 
patterns. 
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6.1 Low level radioactive waste repository 
The discussion complications of the siting of radioactive waste from the Paks nuclear power 
plant fits into the international trends analysing nuclear waste siting, as witnessed by a 
recent paper (Vári–Ferencz, 2006) which undertakes to summarise the events. Although the 
authors examine the siting of low-level waste and high-level waste separately, their 
conclusions apply to both areas.  
The case of the Ófalu repository, which became a symbol of the inadequacy of the top-down 
decision-making mechanism of the socialist regime in the history of low- and intermediate-
level nuclear waste siting looking back on a longer past, has made it very clear that the 
technocratic approach and the consequent total exclusion of the population, a typical feature 
of environmental decision-making in the seventies and eighties, is untenable (Juhasz et al., 
1993; Szíjártó, 1999). Ófalu as a location for the repository was proposed by the Paks 
Powerplant in 1987. The management of the plant did not inform the inhabitants who 
protested vehemently against the decision. As the Bős-Nagymaros Dam and the Dorog 
incinerator case the Ófalu case also a social conflict of the system change at the end of the 
eighties. Their protest was successful; the power plant had to withdraw. 
The case of the selection of the Bátaapáti repository site was a relatively positive example of 
a new variant of environmental decision-making. That decision-making model was based 
on screening methods, which first screened the sites which did not conform to the geological 
and technological criteria, then studied the expected reactions of the population, followed 
by another screening of the candidate sites on the basis of that survey. This model is worth 
comparing with the procedure proposed by Swallow et al. (1992). They developed their 
model in connection with the construction of a solid waste landfill. In Stage 1, the potential 
sites conforming to certain minimum technical standards are selected; in Stage 2, the 
candidates are tested against some social requirements. Stage 2 results in a short list of 
candidates, of which one is selected in Stage 3 through the compilation of a compensation 
package. The investment site to be selected is the one that will be accepted by the population 
at the smallest compensation.  
In the Bátaapáti case their three-stage model was replaced by a more limited decision-
making procedure. In Hungary, the second stage was omitted (in the opinion of Vári & 
Ferencz (2006), Bátaapáti is obviously not a suitable candidate site for a nuclear waste 
repository investment due to its agricultural and recreational profile), but the candidate host 
settlements were highly interested in the problems of the third stage (compensation 
specification, choice of the host settlement). Vári and Ferencz (2006) note that, after the 
systemic change the environmental decision-making model shifted quite noticeably from 
the technocratic to the market model; the investors realised the importance of compensation 
packages and upgraded their communication, often with the assistance of PR companies. 
The conflicts frequently turned the suffering stakeholders themselves against one another, 
and made the candidate settlements compete – due to their vulnerability and economic 
backlog – for hosting the facilities which in their opinion had detrimental effects (this, on the 
other hand, is in good agreement with the model of Swallow et al.).  
6.2 High level radioactive waste management 
Contrary to the previous section, there was no social debate and no definite standpoint was 
adopted concerning the social factors, in the case of Boda, a candidate for siting high-level 
nuclear waste. Back in 1986 the Paks Nuclear Power Plant made a contract with Soviet 
commercial agencies that the Hungarian high-level nuclear waste would be transported to 
the Soviet Union. Yet, after the Soviet Union collapsed this solution became fairly unstable 
therefore the power plant started to make research for the creation of a permanent high-
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level radioactive waste repository (Vári, 2009). The power plant began geological research in 
Boda in 1995 where the siltstone formation seemed to be suitable for placing high-level 
radioactive waste into the ground. Although this research was stopped for three years for 
political reasons in 2002 they were restarted and an underground laboratory was 
constructed in the following years.  
Parallel with the research in Boda, a temporary facility to store spent nuclear fuel was 
established in Paks. It was another success story from the point of view of the Nuclear 
Power Plant, as the repository could be constructed near the Plant. The case is discussed in 
an earlier study by Vári (1996), in which she identifies the following factors as the pledge of 
success: (1) learning acquired from the fiascos of the Ófalu case, acquisition of high-level 
political support, (2) efficient PR activity, (3) shaky civil organisations on the opposite side, 
(4) material interest of the residents of Paks in the operation and even expansion of the 
power plant and (5) the population got accustomed to the proximity of the plant. 
Boda is a small village with less than 500 inhabitants in a mountain region. In 1996 an 
association was formed with other five surrounding municipalities. This association socially 
controlled the research project, continuously informed the people and made decisions about 
the funding that was received from the Paks power plant (Vári, 2009). The communication 
had been intensive from the beginnings, a professional communication agency was assigned 
to create and implement an effective communication campaign. They regularly issued 
newspapers about the topic and they built an Information Office and Park in Boda. 
Interestingly, the residents of Boda seem to have become immune to the series of new 
communication efforts, and the issue of the high level radioactive waste repository has 
become less and less interesting to the public. 
7. Discussion 
Anna Vári, one of the most renowned Hungarian representatives of research programmes 
based on case studies devoted a decisive segment of her research activity to environmental 
conflicts related to siting and to the investigation of the related risk perceptions. Her works 
escorted the emblematic Hungarian environmental conflict cases, so to say: the scandals of 
the construction of the M0 ring road around Budapest; the severe controversies of the 
cyanide pollution conflicts in 2000, the open questions of the Ajka Power Plant investment 
and the problems concerning the siting of nuclear waste originating from Paks. Rather than 
providing a mere case description, the publications of Vári and her colleagues investigate 
the case in its broader context and draw more general conclusions from its progress. Vári 
identifies several reasons of the fiascos. Firstly, the objectives and the general plans have not 
been made clear. Secondly, in several cases, lack of alternatives put things on a forced track 
which was not acceptable for the stakeholders. It was observed on several occasions that the 
public was excluded, that no trust existed, and this has often generated tension even among 
the opponent civil organisations. The predominance of the technocratic approach (almighty 
planning staff), and the inadequate handling of the compensation packages (e.g. to “buy” 
the municipalities) has but intensified the opposition. Although foreign experts and PR 
firms were hired to help with the siting decisions and to communicate them, their success 
was at least dubious; in Vári’s opinion, the foreign instruments and results have not been 
adapted to the Hungarian circumstances. These conclusions seem to apply not only to the 
motorway construction projects but, in a broader sense, to Hungarian siting decisions 
related to waste management facilities as well. 
Risk communication has been a priority issue in Hungary, but there are different 
approaches as to the best manner of this communication. After transition, the new 
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governments wanted to promote authentic information provision on siting matters by 
establishing the necessary legislative background, but it is often quite noticeable that this 
legislation is not enforced. Investors often neglect to inform local inhabitants about the 
potential drawbacks of the planned waste management facilities, and local people are 
seldom invited into the decision making process. The most serious deficiency of the 
communication policies was the predominance of one-sided communication. Despite every 
effort to develop bilateral communication and to integrate some external opinions (for 
example through a monitoring group in the Vác cement case), the companies rarely entered 
in a real dialogue, and the two sides often missed each other’s points. It is not enough to 
organise fora and discussions: people must believe that the companies will pay heed and 
listen to their opinion. It takes two to have a dialogue – if one takes the initiative; the other 
must at least be sufficiently open and receptive. 
The fate of the envisaged facility was decided by local referendum in a major part of the 
siting conflicts. This institution, if coupled with the right to veto, gives considerable power 
to the local community – in such cases, the host settlement exercises the proprietary rights. 
The body of representatives of the settlement, on the other hand, is bound only by the so-
called binding (“decisive”) local referenda, whereas a non-binding referendum will only 
give orientation to the management of the settlement. Several referenda were held in 
connection with the siting decisions discussed in the above case studies. A closer analysis of 
the cases, however, reveals that a negative referendum decision does not necessarily mean 
that the facility will not be built and, surprisingly, the inverse may also happen: the 
predominance of “yes” votes does not always lead to the installation of the facility. In 
Királyszentistván, although the siting of the regional waste repository was rejected twice 
(once at a public hearing and later on at a referendum), the disputed facility could in the end 
be built, since the locals voted “yes” on the third occasion. Note, however, that local 
referenda are often invalid, because less than half of the population goes to the polls. In such 
cases the decision-making right is usually transferred to the body of representatives. 
In Hungary, most line policy issues acquire a very strong political connotation, and 
environmental issues are no exception. The siting decisions and the related social conflicts 
often have a political dimension (cf. the siting conflicts concerning the waste battery 
recycling plants (Szántó, 2010)). Politicians are important actors of social conflicts generated 
by siting decisions: in Vác for example, the Social Control Group was set up on the initiative 
of the mayor. 
No wonder that the protests against the siting decisions are often espoused by the 
opposition parties, which obviously expect to gain political advantages thereby. Those in 
office ever usually support the investors in the hope that job creation and the growing tax 
and other revenues will strengthen their position in the management of the settlement and 
bring them extra votes at the subsequent elections. The central administration is usually also 
interested in the realisation of the siting decisions because, as in the case of the local 
managers, a successful investment may generate political capital for them. It would be 
exaggerated and an oversimplification to say that the siting cases are political games pure 
and simple, aimed at the acquisition of political power, but the attitude and behaviour of the 
government and the opposition politicians, respectively, in relation to the cement factories 
clearly diverge in line with their respective political orientations. Both parties must take this 
– the forceful intervention of politics in the siting conflicts – into account, as well as the fact 
that some will try to exploit the possibilities inherent in the roles played by the politicians. 
The entry of party politics in the siting cases is, of course, not a surprising phenomenon, and 
certainly not a specific Hungarian feature. It is, however, worth separating the party 
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political skirmishes from the political processes in the broader sense which shape the life of 
a settlement. The appearance of a new facility in a settlement may be a decisive affair, so it is 
quite understandable that it is part of the public discourse there and the various interest 
groups express their positions concerning the issue. It is a problem, on the other hand, if 
politics dominates these cases and drives the disputes into a party policy channel, because 
that makes it impossible to develop an open dialogue between the actors. 
8. Conclusion 
This chapter dealt with the development of the social conflicts around waste management 
facility siting in the last two decades of Hungary through case study research. It analyzed 
the most important cases of the last twenty years and explored what were the causes and 
implications of these social conflicts. Research methodologies based on case studies are 
especially popular in the area of siting decisions laden with environmental conflicts, not 
only in Hungary, but also in many other parts of the world where such research is carried 
out. This is no accident. In these cases there are many viewpoints, and many actors with 
different motives, which often provoke serious social conflicts. 
The above review of the most important Hungarian case studies warrants the conclusion 
that the main roots of the research of siting conflicts are sociological ones. In Hungary, the 
sociological approach seems to be the most relevant of all the main trends manifesting 
themselves in the international technical literature. Almost every researcher states the 
domestic siting decisions cannot be discussed without speaking of the role of the social and 
political impacts. Let us risk the statement that this is a typical Central and Eastern 
European, rather than specifically Hungarian, phenomenon. The fact that transition and the 
surge in environmental conflicts occurred at the same historical moment anticipated the lead 
role of the sociological approach beside the psychological and economic ones in the analyses 
in these countries. The cases of the past years, on the other hand, highlight that community 
information programmes, especially the ones deploying PR means, sometimes manage to 
convince the locals that the given facility implies no special hazards to them. These 
techniques, however, cannot replace the participative methodologies recommended to date 
by most Western European and American researchers of the topic (Vári, 1997). 
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